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THE FEDERAL ESTATE TAX BURDEN BORNE
BY A DISSENTING WIDOW
Douglas A. Kahn*
R ENUNCIATION of her deceased husband's will entitles a widow1
to a specified percentage of the husband's net estate (or a dower
interest) in lieu of any benefits she would otherwise have received
under the will.- The size of the dissenting widow's share differs
among the several states, but the normal range is from one third to
one half of her husband's net estate. In some jurisdictions the widow's
share is determined, in whole or in part, according -to the portion
to which she would be entitled if her husband had died intestate,
but in these jurisdictions the widow's share generally cannot exceed
a specified percentage of the estate.4 The property of the decedent
that is subject to the widow's dissent is described by such .terms as
"the net estate," "the surplus after payment of debts," or the "re-
mainder of the personal property."5 Whatever language is employed,
the thrust of the statutory provisions is to protect a widow by giving
her an election to take, in lieu of her husband's testamentary gifts,
a specified share of his real and personal property remaining after
payment of funeral expenses, administrative expenses, and other
claims against the estate. 6
In situations where the decedent's estate is of sufficient size to
cause the imposition of federal estate taxes, the question arises
whether the dissenting widow's share is computed as a fraction of
the decedent's net estate after deducting federal estate taxes, or
whether her share is a fraction of the decedent's net estate computed
without regard to estate taxes. In other words, is the widow obligated
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Michigan.-Ed.
1. For convenience, reference in this article is made only to a widow, but the discus-
sion is equally applicable to a widower who is permitted by local law to renounce his
deceased spouse's will (or who is entitled to an intestate share of her estate), and
thereby becomes entitled to a forced share of her estate.
2. ATKINSON, WILLS 123 (2d ed. 1953).
3. As used in this article, the term "dissenting widow" refers to a widow who has
renounced her husband's will.
4. E.g., D.C. CODF ANN. § 18-211(e) (1961 Supp. III); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27.3178
(139) (1962 Rev.); N.Y. DEC=D. ESr. LAw § 18. Some jurisdictions permit the surviving
widow to take more than half of the decedent's estate (e.g., MONT. REV. CoDEs ANN.
§ 22-107 (1947)), and some provide her with less than one third (e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 46-12 (1958 Rev.) (providing a dissenting widow with a life interest in one
third of the decedent's estate)).
5. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 29-14, 30-3 (Supp. 1965); N.Y. DFC.ED. ESr. LAw § 83.
6. See, e.g., Mead v. Phillips, 135 F.2d 819, 824 (D.C. Cir. 1943); Marans v. New-
land, 143 Mont. 388, 394-95, 390 P.2d 443, 446 (1964).
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to bear a proportionate part of the federal estate tax liability? This
question has become particularly important since the adoption in
1948 of the marital deduction provisions,7 under which all or part
of the widow's share may constitute an estate tax deduction for the
decedent's estate, thus avoiding any estate tax liability., It appears
manifestly unfair to impose an estate tax burden upon the widow
when her share of the estate is excluded from the computation of
the tax.9 Understandably, there has been substantial litigation over
this issue.
The significance of this problem does not rest solely with deter-
mining the size of the widow's share vis-4t-vis the other beneficiaries.
The resolution of the problem will also affect the size of the estate
tax payable to the federal government, since the tax is determined
in part by the amount of property passing to the widow that qualifies
for the marital deduction. 10 Consequently, even if the other bene-
ficiaries of the decedent's estate desire that the widow take the
largest share to which she is entitled, the question of the size of the
widow's share may be litigated with the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue.' The following hypothetical situation illustrates the
dramatic differences in tax liability and in the beneficiaries' partici-
pation in the estate depending on whether the widow's share is com-
puted before or after deducting estate taxes.
It is to be assumed that John Hill died leaving a gross estate of
$1,200,000. John's will provided that all of his property should be
placed in a trust, under which his wife, Mary, is to receive an income
interest for life; upon her death the corpus is to be distributed among
John's issue. John's estate had administrative and funeral expenses
totaling $200,000, of which $140,000 was deducted from the gross
7. Revenue Act of 1948, ch. 168, § 861, 62 Stat. 116. The marital deduction is cm-
bodied in INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2056.
8. Of course, the widow's share of the decedent's estate is liable to the federal gov-
ernment for the payment of any and all estate taxes in the same manner that all of
the property comprising the decedents estate is liable for the tax; in other words, the
tax constitutes a lien on all of the property comprising the decedent's estate. INT. Rv.
CoDE OF 1954, § 6324.
9. See Pitts v. Hamrick, 228 F.2d 486, 490 (4th Cir. 1955).
10. A widow's statutory share is deemed to have passed to her from her deceased
husband (INT. Rxv. CoDE OF 1954, § 2056(e)); therefore, if such property does not ex-
ceed the maximum limitation and does not constitute a terminable interest (for exam-
ple, a widow's dower interest, unless commuted, is a terminable interest), it will qual-
ify for the marital deduction. While the Government has contested deductions claimed
for a widow's commuted dower interest, the courts have allowed such deductions. First
Nat'l Bank v. United States, 335 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1964); Wachovia Bank & Trust Co.
v. United States, 234 F. Supp. 897 (M.D.N.C. 1964).
11. See Merchants Natl Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 246 F.2d 410 (7th Cir.
1957).
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estate. 12 Since the trust corpus does not qualify for the marital deduc-
tion, John's executor would report a taxable estate of $1,000,000
($1,200,000 minus [$140,000 expenses plus $60,000 exemption]), and
the estate will pay an estate tax of $325,700.
Instead of incurring the above tax, however, assume that Mary's
attorney advised 'her to renounce John's will and to take 'her
statutory share, which under local law is one half of 'John's net
estate. If Mary's statutory share is computed before deducting estate
taxes, she will receive $500,000,18 all of which is deductible by the
estate. The executor would report a taxable estate 'of $500,000, and
an estate tax of $145,700 would be due. The remaining $354,300
would be distributed to John's issue. If Mary's share is computed after
deducting the federal estate taxes, the computations are embroiled
in a circuity, since the amount of the estate tax depends upon the
size of Mary's share, and the size of her share is also determined by
the amount of tax that is due. The interdependence of these two
factors can be resolved by a tedious trial-and-error method or by
utilizing a mathematical formula.14 Accordingly, the size of the
widow's share is $411,698, the estate tax payable to the government
is $176,605, and the amount distributable to John's issue is $411,697.
Thus, if the widow's statutory share is computed after deducting
estate taxes, rather than without regaid to such taxes, her share of
the estate will be reduced by $88,302; the federal estate tax liability
will be increased by $30,905; and the share which belongs to John's
issue will be increased'by $57,397. It should be noted that in the fore-
going hypothetical, the decedent's family might desire that the widow
receive a larger share, even at the cost of a reduction of their own
share, in order to obtain a greater estate tax deduction, or they
might be unwilling to sacrifice part of their share. In any event, the
Commissioner may disallow part of the marital deduction if he
decides that under local law the widow's share must bear a propor-
tionate part of the estate tax. While the principal concern of this
article is the impact of federal estate taxes on a widow's statutory
12. Under INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 642(g), the executor may elect to treat admin-
istrative expenses, in whole or in part, as either estate tax deductions or income tax
deductions. In the hypothetical, it is assumed that $60,000 of administrative expenses
were treated as an income tax deduction.
13. Mary's share would be half of $1,200,000 minus the $200,000 expenses for admin-
istration and the funeral.
14. P-H FED. EST. & GIFr TAx SERv. 120576. See Second Nat'l Bank v. United
States, 351. F.2d 489, 495 (2d Cir. 1965), where the court stated: "The intricate
algebraic formulae and the arithmetical backing and filling required to compute the
tax attest to this complexity."
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share, it should be noted that identical questions arise in situations
where the widow's husband dies intestate.
The protagonists for burdening the widow's interest with federal
estate taxes rely primarily on the statutory language of the specific
local law provisions that delineate the size of her forced share. Their
contention is that the federal estate tax is a claim against the estate,
and that it is similar to debts of the decedent and administrative
and funeral expenses. They feel that since the widow's share is a
percentage of the net estate, which is computed after satisfaction of
all estate obligations other than testamentary dispositions, the federal
estate taxes should be treated no differently from other claims and
accordingly should be deducted prior to computing the widow's
share.15 Except where the applicable state statute under which the
widow dissents specifically refers to federal estate taxes,'0 the con-
flict of decisions on this issue cannot be explained solely by reference
to the differences in language employed in the various statutes. Vir-
tually all such statutes will accommodate a construction that the
estate tax must first be deducted, and indeed, when read literally,
the statutes may well indicate that result. However, many of these
statutes were enacted prior to the 1948 adoption of the marital deduc-
tion provision, which altered the widow's position with regard to
the estate's tax liability, so that her tax posture is now quite
different from her position with regard to other estate obligations.
Consequently, the dispositive issue is not merely a designation of the
literal meaning of the statutory language; rather, there must be a
determination of the legislative policy underlying the statute and
of the question whether the deduction of federal estate taxes fur-
thers or frustrates that policy.' 7 Even where the state statute was
15. See Herson v. Mills, 221 F. Supp. 714 (D.D.C. 1963); Northern Trust Co. v.
Wilson, 344 Ill. App. 508, 101 N.E.2d 604 (1951); Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Green,
236 N.C. 654, 73 S.E.2d 879 (1953); Campbell v. Lloyd, 162 Ohio St. 203, 122 N.E.2d
695 (1954); Guaranty Nat'l Bank v. Mitchell, 111 S.E.2d 494 (W. Va. 1959). The writer
was counsel for the plaintiff in Herson.
16. See N.C. GrN. STAT. § 30-3 (Supp. 1965). Compare First Union Nat'l Bank v.
Melvin, 259 N.C. 255, 130 S.E.2d 387 (1963), with Tolson v. Young, 260 N.C. 506, 133
S.E.2d 135 (1963).
17. See Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377, 386 (1948), where the Court
quoted from People of Puerto Rico v. Shell Oil Co., 302 U.S. 253, 258 (1937): "'Words
generally have different shades of meaning and are to be construed if reasonably pos-
sible to effectuate the intent of the lawmakers; and this meaning in particular instances
is to be arrived at not only by a consideration of the words themselves, but by con-
sidering, as well, the context, the purposes of the law, and the circumstances under
which the words were employed.'" For examples of an application of the above canon
of construction to the computation of a widow's share, see Marans v. Newland, 143
Mont. 388, 390 P.2d 443 (1964); In re Wolf's Estate, 307 N.Y. 280, 121 N.E.2d 224 (1954).
[Vol. 64:14991502
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enacted or amended after 1948, it is quite possible that the special
problems created by the adoption of the marital deduction provision
were not considered by the legislature.
The arguments in favor of disregarding estate tax liability in
computing the widow's share will normally fall into one or more
of five broad categories. First, it is argued that under local statutes
or equitable doctrines, federal estate tax liability should be borne
proportionately by the property included in the decedent's taxable
estate, and to the extent that the widow's share constitutes an estate
tax deduction, it is not included in the decedent's taxable estate and.
therefore should not bear any part of the estate tax liability. Second,
many people point out that the congressional purpose for enacting the
marital deduction provisions in 1948 was to minimize the disparity
in federal tax treatment of married couples in community property
and common-law states, and that burdening the widow's share with
a portion of the estate tax (with a corresponding increase in estate
tax liability) creates substantial tax disadvantages to which an estate
in a community property jurisdiction is not subject. Consequently,
the congressional policy of substantial equalization would be frus-
trated if the widow's share were included in the taxable estate. 19
Third, it is frequently argued that the imposition of a portion of
the estate tax burden on the widow's deductible share is "unfair
and unjust" because it requires her to satisfy an obligation arising
from the disposition of property which she did not make or receive.2 0
Fourth, it is asserted that the state's legislative purpose in enacting
a forced share provision-protection of the widow against insufficient
testamentary recognition by her deceased husband-may be frus-
trated where the widow's share is burdened by estate taxes, which
in some circumstances could reduce her share to little or nothing.21
18. See In re Fuch's Estate, 60 So. 2d 536 (Fla. 1952); Seymour Nat'l Bank v. Heide-
man, 133 Ind. App. 104, 178 N.E.2d 771 (1961); Jones v. Jones, 376 S.W.2d 210 (Mo.
1964) (en banc); In re Wolf's Estate, supra note 17; In re Rosenfeld's Estate, 376 Pa.
42, 101 A.2d 684 (1954).
19. See Dodd v. United States, 345 F.2d 715 (3d Cir. 1965); First Nat'l Bank v.
United States, 233 F. Supp. 19 (D. Kan. 1964) (widow's intestate share); In re Glover's
Estate, 371 P.2d 361, 378 (Hawaii 1962) (Lewis & Mizuha, JJ., dissenting); Lincoln Bank
8 Trust Co. v. Huber, 240 S.W.2d 89 (Ky. Ct. App. 1951); In re Burnett, 50 N.J. Super.
482, 142 A.2d 695 (1958) (testamentary residuary' bequest to widow).
20. See Pitts v. Hamrick, 228 F.2d 486, 489 (4th Cir. 1955); Hammond v. Wheeler,
347 S.W.2d 884, 893 (Mo. 1961); Gesner v. Roberts, 88 N.J. Super. 278, 212 A.2d 43
(Ch. 1965) (testamentary residuary bequest to widow).
21. See Marans v. Newland, 143 Mont. 388, 390 P.2d 443 (1964); In re Wolf's Estate,
307 N.Y. 280, 121 N.E.2d 224 (1954). The danger that the tax might destroy the widow's
share is not merely hypothetical. For example, In re Gato's Estate, 276 App. Div. 651,
97 N.Y.S.2d 171, aff'd, 301 N.Y. 653, 93 N.E.2d 924 (1950), involved an estate where the
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Fifth, it is urged that the legislature of a common-law state would
probably desire that the "geographical equalization" sought by
Congress in enacting the marital deduction be enjoyed by the cit-
izens of that state to the fullest extent, and that this objective can-
not be accomplished if the widow's deductible share bears the estate
tax.22 Finally, in one case involving a testamentary residuary bequest
to the surviving widow, the court suggested an additional ground.
The court concluded that the probable intent of the deceased hus-
band was to obtain the maximum deduction and thereby minimize
estate taxes, and in the absence of a showing of a contrary intent,
that purpose should be fulfilled.23 However, that rationale is not
very persuasive in the case of a dissenting widow.
Before discussing the relative merits of the dissenting widow's
position, it may be helpful to consider the applicability and operation
of federal estate tax apportionment, whether by statute or by judicial
construction, since apportionment is one of the major arguments
offered on behalf of the widow. Once the principle of apportion-
ment is in focus, we can then examine the several contentions dis-
cussed above.
I. APPORTIONMENT OF FEDERAL ESTATE TAXES
From its inception in 1916, the federal estate tax law has required
that the decedent's executor make the estate tax payments that are
due the Government.24 Because of this provision, the courts in many
early cases determined that federal law required that the estate tax
be paid out of the residue of the estate without contribution from
other probate and non-probate assets. 25 In response to those decisions,
net probated value was $180,571, but the total federal estate tax (arising in part from
property transferred during the decedent's life that was nevertheless included in his
taxable estate) totaled more than $190,500. In that case, the widow's share was saved
through the application of an equitable apportionment of the estate tax.
22. See Dodd v. United States, 345 F.2d 715 (3d Cir. 1965); Gesner v. Roberts, 88
N.J. Super. 278, 212 A.2d 43 (Ch. 1965).
23. Gesner v. Roberts, supra note 22.
24. Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 207, 39 Stat. 779. Section 208 of the Revenue
Act of 1916, 39 Stat. 779 (the predecessor of INT. REV. CODE or 1954, § 2205) provided
that if any person other than the executor acting as such paid the estate tax, that
person was entitled to reimbursement from the undistributed estate or to contribution
from the distributees of the estate whose shares would have been reduced if the estate
tax had been paid prior to distribution of the estate.
25. See Plunkett v. Old Colony Trust Co., 233 Mass. 471, 124 N.E. 265 (1919);
Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Winthrop, 238 N.Y. 488, 144 N.E. 769 (1924); Y.M.C.A.
v. Davis, 106 Ohio St. 366, 140 N.E. 114 (1922), aff'd, 264 U.S. 47 (1924). Contra, Hamp-
ton's Adm'rs v. Hampton, 188 Ky. 199, 221 S.W. 496 (1920). For a discussion of the
history of estate tax apportionment, see Sutter, Apportionment of Federal Estate
Taxes, 51 MicH. L. REv. 53 (1952).
1504 [Vol. 64:1499
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the New York legislature enacted a statute in 1930 providing for
the apportionment of federal estate taxes, unless the decedent di-
rected otherwise, among the persons entitled to any property included
in the gross estate of the decedent for federal estate tax purposes.26
An increasing number of states have followed New York's example,
and have adopted some form of apportionment of federal estate
taxes.27
The New York apportionment statute was held unconstitutional
in a 1941 decision of the New York Court of Appeals on the ground
that the estate tax laws required that the tax be borne by the residue
of the estate, and that the New York statute therefore contravened
federal law.28 In Riggs v. Del Drago,29 the United States Supreme
Court reversed the New York decision, upheld the constitutionality
of New York's apportionment statute, and resolved beyond dispute
that Congress intended that the determination of the ultimate
placing of the estate tax burden rest on state law rather than federal
law. Since the Riggs decision, the courts have uniformly applied
state law, and indeed have moved so far from the earlier decisions
applying federal law that the Supreme Court of North Carolina has
suggested 'that Congress might be constitutionally prohibited by
the tenth amendment from preempting state-law control.8 0
A. Equitable Apportionment
In many of those states that do not have apportionment statutes,
the local courts have nevertheless effected an apportionment of
federal estate taxes pursuant to the doctrine of "equitable appor-
tionment," which, is nothing more than a specific application of the
26. N.Y. Decedent Estate Law, ch. 709, § 124, Laws of 1930. In apportioning the
tax, allowance was made for deductions permitted under the tax laws. This statute,
as modified, is now N.Y. DEcE. EST. LAW, art. 4, § 124.
27. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 150 (1958); CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 970-77, CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-401 (1958); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 2901 (1953); FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 734.041 (Supp. 1965); LA. REv. STAT. §§ 9.2431-38 (1965); Mn. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 162
(1965 Replacement); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 65A, § 5 (1964); MiCH. STAT. ANN. § 27.3178
(167.101-111) (Supp. 1965); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 525.521-28 (Supp. 1965); NEB. REv.
STAT. § 77-2108 (1958); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 88-A:1 to :12 (Supp. 1965); NJ. STAT.
ANN. §§ 3A.25-30 to -38 (1953); OELA. STAT. ANN. tit. 58, §§ 2001-11 (Supp. 1965); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 881-87 (Supp. 1965); TENN. CODE ANN. § 30-1117 (1955); VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 64-150 to -155 (1950); W. VA. CODE OF 1961, tit. 2, § 4162(l); Wyo. STAT.
§§ 2-336 to 346 (Supp. 1965). Under an Alabama statute, the tax is to be paid from
the residuary of the estate without proration, unless the decedent provided otherwise.
ALA. CODE tit. 51, § 449(1) (1958).
28. In re Del Drago's Estate, 287 N.Y. 61, 38 N.E.2d 131 (1941).
29. $17 U.S. 95 (1942). See also Rogan v. Taylor, 136 F.2d 598 (9th Cir. 1943).
30. See Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Green, 236 N.C. 654, 73 S.E.2d 879 (1953).
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equitable concept of contribution.31 However, the courts of a number
of jurisdictions have rejected this equitable doctrine. 2
Equitable contribution is an ancient doctrine grounded on the
premise that persons having a common interest in property, or a
common burden, should bear in proportion any obligation imposed
thereon, or any such common burden. Specifically, if several parties
will benefit from the removal of a lien or similar obligation, then all
of them should bear the cost of that removal, and where one of them
has borne a disproportionate share of the cost, he is entitled to
contribution from the others.33
While the payment of the estate tax is the immediate responsi-
bility of the executor,3 4 the obligation is imposed on him only for
convenience of collection, and all of the assets comprising the
decedent's gross estate (including non-probate assets) are subject to
a lien for unpaid taxes. Similarly, each of the persons receiving
property from the decedent (before or after his demise and by
reason of any action or inaction of the decedent) that is included in
the decedent's gross estate is personally liable, to the extent of the
value of such property at the date of decedent's death, for any unpaid
tax.3 5 Consequently, it would be inequitable to impose the burden
of the estate tax on one or more transferees of decedents' properties
while exempting others, since all the transferees benefit proportion-
ately by the payment of the tax and the concomitant release from
both the lien on their property and the personal liability. The courts
of a number of states having no apportionment statute have applied
equitable apportionment so that the estate tax is not borne solely
by the residuary legatees, but rather is shared by those who received
from the decedent, either prior to or at the time of his death, property
or interests in property that are included in the decedent's gross
estate.36
31. E.g., Wilmington Trust Co. v. Copeland, 33 Del. Ch. 399, 94 A.2d 703 (1953);
Pearcy v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 121 Ind. App. 136, 96 N.E.2d 918, rehearing denied,
98 N.E.2d 232 (1951).
32. See Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Green, 236 N.C. 654, 73 S.E.2d 879 (1953);
Guaranty Natl Bank v. Mitchell, in1 S.E.2d 494 (W. Va. 1959).
33. 2 POMEROY, EQurrY JURISPRtDENCE § 407, at 147-48 (5th ed. 1941). See also Wil-
mington Trust Co. v. Copeland, 33 Del. Ch. 399, 409, 94 A.2d 703, 708 (1953).
34. Ir. Pcv. CODE OF 1954, § 2002.
35. INT. I -v. CODE OF 1954, § 6324.
36. Equitable apportionment has been applied by the following states: Colorado
(Ramsey v. Nordloh, 354 P.2d 513 (Colo. 1960)); Georgia (Regents of the University
System of Georgia v. Trust Co., 194 Ga. 255, 21 S.E.2d 691 (1942)); Indiana (Pearcy v.
Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 121 Ind. App. 136, 96 N.E.2d 918, rehearing denied, 98
N.E.2d 232 (1951)); Iowa (Kintzinger v. Millin, 254 Iowa 173, 117 N.W.2d 68 (1962));
Kentucky (Trimble v. Hatcher's Executors, 295 Ky. 178, 173 S.W.2d 985 (1943), cert.
1506 [Vol. 64:1499
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B. Differentiation Between Probate and Non-Probate Assets
Assets or interests in assets may be included in a decedent's gross
estate for tax purposes, even though they are not subject to probate.
Such non-probate assets include life insurance, jointly held property,
certain inter vivos transfers, and property over which the decedent
possessed a general power of appointment.37 The courts have been
more receptive to a claim for contribution from the recipients of
non-probate assets than to a claim for contribution from testamentary
legatees and devisees. 38 This distinction conforms with the principal
underlying purpose of apportionment rules, and indeed of all rules
concerning the disposition of a decedent's estate, that is, to accom-
plish the testator's wishes, and where the testator's intent is not
shown, to provide rules that are most likely to approximate the
testator's desires. A testator is often unaware of the estate tax con-
sequences caused by non-probate assets; if he had been informed, he
might have desired that the recipients of the non-probate property
bear their proportionate share of the tax. On the other hand, a
testator is usually aware of the potential estate tax burden on his
testamentary estate and presumably intends that the estate tax
imposed on the testamentary estate will be borne solely by the
residue of his estate.39 Moreover, administrative expenses of the
estate and claims against the estate for the decedent's debts are a
denied, 321 U.S. 747 (1944)); Maine (Gragdon v. Worthley, 153 A.2d 627 (Me. 1959));
Missouri (Hammond v. Wheeler, 347 S.W.2d 884 (Mo. 1961); Carpenter v. Carpenter,
364 Mo. 782, 267 S.W.2d 632 (1954)); Montana (Marans v. Newland, 143 Mont. 388, 390
P.2d 443 (1964)); New Mexico (In re Gallagher's Will, 57 N.M. 112, 255 P.2d 317 (1953));
Ohio (McDougall v. Central Nat'l Bank, 157 Ohio St. 45, 104 N.E.2d 441 (1952)); Oregon
(Beatty v. Cake, 236 Ore. 498, 387 P.2d 355 (1963)); Rhode Island (Boyd v. Jordan, 168
A.2d 286 (R.I. 1961); Industrial Trust Co. v. Budlong, 77 R.I. 428, 76 A.2d 600 (1950));
South Carolina (Myers v. Sinkler, 110 S.E2d 241 (S.C. 1959)).
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit applied equitable apportionment to
require contribution by an inter vivos trust in a situation where Arizona law was
controlling. Doetsch v. Doetsch, 312 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1963). Moreover, the courts of
several states with apportionment statutes have applied equitable apportionment in
cases arising under facts controlled by the laws of such states prior to the adoption
of the apportionment statutes. See, e.g., Wilmington Trust Co. v. Copeland, 33 Del.
Ch. 399, 94 A.2d 703 (1953); Succession of Ratcliff, 212 La. 563, 33 So. 2d 114 (1947);
In re Gato's Estate, 276 App. Div. 651, 97 N.Y.S.2d 171, aff'd, 301 N.Y. 653, 93 N.E.2d
924 (1950) (applying Florida law).
37. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 2035-38, 2040-42.
38. See In re Glover's Estate, 371 P.2d 361, 372 (Hawaii 1962), where the court
refused to relieve the dissenting widow's share of the burden of estate taxes, but ex-
pressly left undecided the question whether contribution could be required from bene-
ficiaries of non-probate assets under principles of equitable apportionment. See also
Carpenter v. Carpenter, 364 Mo. 782, 267 S.W.2d 632 (1954).
39. See St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Krueger, 377 S.W.2d 303 (Mo. 1964) (en banc);
Beatty Y Cake, 236 Ore. 498, 387 P.2d 355, 359 (1963).
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charge against all of the assets of the probate estate, but payment is
made from the residue, if there are sufficient assets in the residue,
because of a predetermined priority of abatement. To the extent
that estate taxes arise on account of assets in the probate estate, they
should be treated similarly. However, to the extent that estate taxes
arise on account of non-probate assets, the recipients of those assets
should not be permitted to benefit from a rule of abatement estab-
lished for probate assets.
The rules applying or rejecting apportionment of taxes, whether
established by statute or judicial decision, are operative only when
the decedent has failed to indicate his intent, and of course they
must yield to an express provision (or even to an implied ex-
pression of intent) in the decedent's will concerning an allocation of
the tax burden.40 Indeed, in United States v. Goodson,41 involving
the law of Minnesota, which at the time of the case had no apportion-
ment statute and had rejected equitable apportionment, 42 the court
required contribution from the recipients of non-probate assets
(the trustee of an inter vivos trust created by the decedent, and co-
owners of property held jointly with the decedent), even though
there was no provision for such payment in the trust instrument or
in the deed. The court grounded its decision on a provision in the
decedent's will stating that he desired that non-probate assets should
bear their proportionate share of the tax.
As noted above, courts fashioning rules of equitable apportion-
ment properly distinguish between probate and non-probate assets
and require contribution only from recipients of the latter, since
that result will most frequently represent the unexpressed intent of
the decedent. However, the tax apportionment rules enacted by state
legislatures have a broader reach and usually require contribution
from testamentary beneficiaries as well.43 Thus, the burden is placed
40. Ramsey v. Nordloh, 354 P.2d 513 (Colo. 1960); Knowles v. National Bank, 345
Mich. 671, 76 N.W.2d 813 (1956); Commerce Trust Co. v. Starling, 393 S.W.2d 489,
494 (Mo. 1965); Case v. Roebling, 42 N.J. Super. 545, 127 A.2d 409 (1956); Baylor v.
National Bank of Commerce, 194 Va. 1, 72 S.E.2d 282 (1952). Of course, in situations
where a widow renounces her deceased husband's will, she cannot be deprived of her
rights to equitable or statutory apportionment by a provision in that will, nor can
she benefit from any provision in the will imposing the tax burden on the residuary
estate. See Herson v. Mills, 221 F. Supp. 714 (D.D.C. 1963); Marans v. Newland, 143
Mont. 388, 390 P.2d 443 (1964); In re Uihlein's Will, 264 Wis. 362, 59 N.W.2d 641 (1953).
But see In re Barnhart's Estate, 102 N.H. 519, 162 A.2d 168 (1960); Commerce Union
Bank v. Albert, 201 Tenn..631, 301 S.W.2d 352 (1957) (granting a dissenting widow the
benefits of a tax clause in her deceased husband's will).
41. 253 F.2d 900 (8th Cir. 1958).
42. Gelin v. Gelin, 229 Minn. 516, 40 N.W.2d 842 (1949). Minnesota subsequently
enacted an apportionment statute. See note 27 supra.
43. E.g., MicH. STAT. ANN. § 27.3178 (167.101-111) (1965 Supp.); N.Y. DECE.D, ESr,
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on the testator to indicate a contrary intent if he prefers to exempt
certain bequests or devises from estate tax burdens. It is difficult to
determine whether that aspect of the apportionment statutes is the
product of a legislative determination of the likely intention of a
decedent, or whether it is an expression of legislative policy favoring
an equitable distribution of the estate tax burden. In any event, the
equitable distribution of the tax burden has some visceral appeal,
and a testator retains the power to change this result if he wishes to
do so by inserting an appropriate tax clause in his will.
There is one area of testamentary disposition that clearly warrants
the application of rules of apportionment: the bequest and devise of
a fractional share of a decedent's estate to his widow. In most in-
stances, the testator wishes to obtain the maximum marital deduc-
tion, and he may have refrained from giving his widow his entire
estate only for tax reasons. Consequently, the widow's share should be
exonerated from estate tax burdens to the extent that it qualifies
for the marital deduction, since that result would accomplish the
intent of the testator in most circumstances. The widow's share is
normally exonerated under apportionment statutes, either by express
reference or by a provision that any deduction or exemption allowed
by reason of the relationship of any person to the decedent shall
inure to the benefit of that person. It is more difficult to utilize the
doctrine of equitable apportionment for this purpose, but it is this
writer's view that it should be so applied. A testator's desire to min-
imize taxes is no less typical thin his desire that non-probate assets
participate in the satisfaction of the estate tax obligation. A recent
decision of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit exonerated
a widow's fractional share of the residue in a situation where no
apportionment rules were applicable.44 This decision was based
partially on the presumption that the testator intended to minimize
the estate tax burden.
The unique considerations compelling contribution from the
recipients of non-probate assets are perhaps best demonstrated by
the fact that it is only as to such assets that the federal government
has undertaken to prescribe the manner of apportionment of the
estate tax burden, although only two classes of non-probate assets
LAW art. 4, § 124; see Jerome v. Jerome, 139 Conn. 285, 93 A.2d 139 (1952). Florida,
Massachusetts, and New Jersey either do not provide for tax apportionment among
probated assets or have a form of apportionment different from that provided for
non-probate assets. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 734.041 (Supp. 1965); MAss. ANN. LAws
ch. 65A, § 5 (1964); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3A.25-31 (1953).
44. Dodd v. United States, 345 F.2d 715 (3d Cir. 1965).
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are covered by the federal statutes. As early as 1919, the federal
estate tax law empowered executors to recover contributions for
payment of estate taxes from the beneficiaries of insurance on a
decedent's life, if the insurance proceeds were included in the
decedent's gross estate. This provision, with a few modifications, has
remained effective since that date. 45 From 1919 until 1942, the only
federal provision for apportioning estate taxes applied to life insur-
ance proceeds. In 1942, Congress enacted a similar provision requir-
ing contribution from persons receiving property over which the
decedent once possessed a general power of appointment, if such prop-
erty were included in the decedent's gross estate. 4 In 1948, when
Congress adopted the marital deduction provisions for the estate
tax, it amended these two apportionment provisions to preclude
contribution from insurance proceeds or appointive property which
passes or has passed to the surviving spouse and for which a marital
deduction was allowed.47 The two provisions are now set forth in sec-
tions 2206 and 2207 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 and con-
stitute the only provision for apportionment of estate taxes in federal
law. It is difficult to understand why these two types of non-probate
assets have been singled out while other non-probate properties
included in the decedent's gross estate (such as jointly held property,
transfers in contemplation of death, and transfers with retained life
interests) have been ignored. The two sections have been criticized
as piecemeal legislation, and it has been suggested that they should
either be expanded or repealed.48 An expansion of these provisions
to provide for tax apportionment as to all property included in the
decedent's gross estate would eliminate both the patchwork of appor-
tionment rules that now apply throughout the fifty states and the
difficult conflict-of-laws question whether contribution from recipi-
ents of the property of the decedent is determined under the law of
the state in which the decedent was domiciled at death or under the
law of the state in which the situs of the property is located.49 In the
45. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 408, 40 Stat. 1100 (1919). This provision, as
amended, is now contained in INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2206. Of course, this rule
for apportionment is inapplicable when the decedent has provided in his will for some
other scheme.
46. Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 403(c), 56 Stat. 943. This provision, as amended,
is now contained in INT. Rxv. CODE OF 1954, § 2207. The rule for apportionment is
inapplicable if the decedent has made some other provision in his will.
47. Revenue Act of 1948, ch. 168, § 365, 62 Stat. 124.
48. See Cahn, Local Law in Federal Taxation, 52 YALE L.J. 799, 813 (1943), where
it is suggested that the better alternative was to repeal both provisions and leave the
matter entirely to state law.
49. See Scoles, Apportionment of Federal Estate Taxes and Conflicts of Laws, 55
COLUM. L. REv. 261 (1955). Compare Doetsch v. Doetsch, 312 F.2d 323, 327-28 (7th Cir.
1963), and In re Bernays' Estate, 150 Fla. 414, 7 So. 2d 444 (1942), with Isaacson v,
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absence of federally imposed uniformity, a beneficiary's estate tax
burden may vary greatly under the laws of the several states, and in
our mobile society the controlling state law may change from year to
year as the decedent changes his domicile or as the situs of the prop-
erty changes. Therefore, the extent of a beneficiary's federal tax bur-
den may turn on where the decedent happened to reside at the date
of his death or where the trustee of an inter vivos trust holds the trust
corpus. Of course, a testator can control the apportionment of taxes
by a specific provision in his will, but it is doubtful that the testator
could require tax contribution from an irrevocable inter vivos trust
through a testamentary provision.50 Moreover, the testator might be
reluctant to insert a provision in the trust instrument requiring the
trustee to pay any estate taxes caused by inclusion of the trust corpus
in the grantor's estate, for fear that such a provision might have ad-
verse probative value in a controversy with the Government as to
whether the trust corpus was transferred in contemplation of death.
The question has been raised whether the tenth amendment pre-
cludes Congress from enacting provisions determining the ultimate
burden of estate taxes, and whether the authority of Congress is
limited solely to the imposition and collection of the tax.51 How-
ever, it appears virtually certain that Congress, having the power to
levy an estate tax, also has the power to determine who shall bear
the cost of that tax.52 The validity of sections 2206 and 2207 may yet
be tested, since Alabama law provides inter alia that estate taxes shall
be paid out of the residue of the estate, and that the executor has
no duty to recover from anyone a pro rata portion of the estate tax
attributable to inclusion of property, including life insurance pro-
ceeds, in the decedent's gross estate.53 The Alabama provision appears
irreconcilable with the federal statutes.
II. APPORTIONMENT AND THE DISSENTING WIDOW'S SHARE
In several instances, courts have treated the existence or absence
of apportionment rules as virtually dispositive of a dissenting widow's
Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 325 Mass. 469, 91 N.E.2d $34 (1950), and Beatty v.
Cake, 236 Ore. 498, 587 P.2d 355 (1968).
50. But see United States v. Goodson, 253 F.2d 900 (8th Cir. 1958), where the court
required contribution from recipients of non-probate assets because of a provision in
the decedent's will.
51. See Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Green, 236 N.C. 654, 73 S.E.2d 879 (1953);
1 MERTENs, FEDERAL GI r & ESTATE TAXATION § 1.15, at 46-51 (1959 ed.).
52. New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345 (1921); In re Del Drago's Estate,
287 N.Y. 61, 76-78, 38 N.E.2d 131, 138-39 (1941), rev'd on other grounds, 317 U.S. 95
(1942).
53. ALA. CoDE tit. 51, § 449(1) (1958).
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demand that her share be computed without regard to estate tax
liability.q4 However, in a number of cases the courts have held that
the computation of the widow's share is determined only by the
language of the statute defining her share, and that the applicability
of apportionment rules is therefore irrelevant.55 Since the support
given the widow's position by a statutory rule of apportionment is
greater than the support provided by the applicability of equitable
apportionment rules, the two types of rules should be considered
separately.
A. Equitable Apportionment
As noted above, the function of the equitable apportionment
rule is to distribute the estate tax burden equitably among the parties
owning property or interests in property that was included in the
decedent's estate for tax purposes and who therefore benefited from
the payment of the tax, since the payment released the federal lien
imposed on their property and relieved them of personal liability.
To the extent that property passing or having passed to the widow
qualifies for the marital deduction, such property does not create
any estate tax liability and therefore should be exempted from
contributing toward the payment of the tax."0 In situations where a
widow renounces her deceased husband's will, she is entitled to a
specified percentage of her husband's net estate (defined in differing
terms by the various state statutes), and if the net estate is determined
after making an allowance for estate taxes, the widow will, in effect,
bear a portion of that tax even though her share is tax deductible.
Thus, the question is whether the applicability of the doctrine of
equitable apportionment modifies the statutory language describing
the dissenting widow's share in situations where such language does
not explicitly direct that estate taxes be taken into account. 7
54. Compare Northern Trust Co. v. Wilson, 344 111. App. 508, 513-15, 101 N.E.2d 604,
607 (1951), and Guaranty Nat'l Bank v. Mitchell, 111 S.E.2d 494 (W. Va. 1959), with
Seymour Nat'1 Bank v. Heideman, 133 Ind. App. 104, 178 N.E.2d 171 (1961), and In re
Wolf's Estate, 307 N.Y. 280, 121 N.E.2d 224 (1954).
55. See Old Colony Trust Co. v. McGowan, 156 Me. 138, 163 A.2d 538 (1960);
Campbell v. Lloyd, 162 Ohio St. 203, 122 N.E.2d 695 (1954).
56. Doetsch v. Doetsch, 312 F.2d 323, 329-30 (7th Cir. 1963).
57. ORE. REV. STAT. tit. 11, ch. 13, § 0.50 (1964), expressly provides that the dis.
senting widow's share is to be computed without regard to the federal estate tax to
the extent that it qualifies for the marital deduction. The North Carolina courts
rejected the dissenting widow's contention in Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Green,
236 N.C. 654, 73 S.E.2d 879 (1953), and held that her share must be computed as a
fraction of the decedent's estate after allowance for estate taxes. Several months after
the Green decision, the North Carolina legislature provided that a dissenting widow's
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. Initially, consideration must be given to the question whether
property which qualifies for the marital deduction (irrespective of
whether the property passed to the widow prior to her husband's
death, by testamentary disposition, by intestacy, or pursuant to the
widow's election) should be required to bear a proportionate part of
the estate tax burden. The widow's property that qualifies for the
marital deduction is included in her husband's gross estate58 and
therefore is subject to the federal tax lien for payment of estate
taxes. In addition, the widow is personally liable for that payment. 9
The widow benefits from the payment of the estate tax to the same
extent as the other beneficiaries, and thus it may seem fair that she
should bear a proportionate part of the tax. However, the equitable
doctrine of contribution requires a sharing of a common burden only
by persons whose equities are equal. 60 While the tax liability is
imposed on all participants in the gross estate, their equities are
unequal, since the widow's share is tax deductible and the others
are not. Consequently, where equitable apportionment is applicable,
contribution is required according to the participants' share of the
decedent's taxable estate, and to the extent that the widow's share
is deductible, it is not included in the taxable estate, thus exonerating
the widow from contributing to the tax burden.61
However, exoneration of a widow's deductible share from estate
tax liability is not dispositive of the question of the size of her forced
share. In instances where a widow renounces her deceased husband's
will, she becomes entitled to a portion of his estate computed ac-
cording to -the statutory provisions of the state of her husband's
domicile (or perhaps of the state in which the situs of property is
located). If her share is computed after allowance for federal estate
taxes, the net effect of the computation is to charge her with a portion
of the estate tax burden. Nevertheless, the manner of computation
share was to be computed without regard to estate taxes where her deceased spouse
was not survived by a parent or by lineal descendants. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-3 (Supp.
1965); see First Union Natl Bank v. Melvin, 259 N.C. 255, 130 S.E.2d 387 (1963).
However, in cases where the deceased husband is survived by a parent or lineal de-
scendants, the dissenting widow must bear a portion of the tax. Tolson v. Young,
260 N.C. 506, 133 S.E.2d 135 (1963).
58. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2056(a).
59. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6324(a).
60. See Vickers Petroleum Co. v. Bliffle, 239 F.2d 602 (10th Cir. 1956); George's
Radio, Inc. v. Capital Transit Co., 126 F.2d 219 (D.C. Cir. 1942); 4 PorsRoy, EQUrTY
JuiuspRumENcE § 1222, at 662-63 (5th ed. 1941).
61. See Doetsch v. Doetsch, 312 F.2d 323, 329-30 (7th Cir. 1963); Seymour Nat'l
Bank v. Heideman, 133 Ind. App. 104, 178 N.E2d 771 (1961); Jones v. Jones, 376
S.W.2d 210 (Mo. 1964) (en banc).
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turns upon the construction of the specific statutory language de-
fining the dissenting widow's share, rather than upon a determination
of whether she should be burdened by the estate tax. Moreover, the
rationale of the doctrine of equitable apportionment does not accord
with granting equitable treatment to the beneficiaries so much as
it does with approximating the unexpressed intent of the decedent;
of course, the intent of the decedent is irrelevant in computing a
dissenting widow's share.
The courts of two states-Maine and Ohio-have adopted the
doctrine of equitable apportionment, but have nevertheless rejected
a dissenting widow's contention that her forced share should be
computed without regard to estate taxes. In Bragdon v. Worthley,02
the Maine court adopted and applied equitable apportionment.
Subsequently, in Old Colony Trust Co. v. McGowan,0 3 the court
rejected a dissenting widow's contention that her forced share of the
estate should be computed without regard to estate taxes. However,
the court granted the widow partial relief in holding that taxes on
non-probated assets were not to be deducted before computing the
widow's share, since she was entitled to equitable contribution from
the recipients of those assets and therefore could not be charged with
any portion of the tax imposed on their account.
Ohio adopted equitable apportionment in 1952 in McDougall v.
Central National Bank.64 The Ohio courts first accepted a dissenting
widow's contention as to the computation of her share in Miller v.
Hammond,65 but in a subsequent case two years later the court over-
ruled Hammond and held that estate taxes must be deducted in com-
puting the widow's share.(' Although the Ohio courts did not reject
the doctrine of equitable apportionment, they did reject the appli-
cability of that doctrine to the computation of a dissenting widow's
share. Similarly, the Supreme Court of Hawaii rejected a dissenting
widow's assertion that her forced share should be computed without
regard to estate taxes, but it did not deem the question of whether
the court should adopt equitable apportionment as dispositive of
the case and expressly left that question unanswered.(7
In sum, the existence of the equitable apportionment doctrine is
62. 153 A.2d 627 (Me. 1959).
63. 156 Me. 138, 163 A.2d 538 (1960).
64. 157 Ohio St. 45, 104 N.E.2d 441 (1952). See also In re McKitrick's Estate, 172
N.E.2d 197 (Ohio P. Ct. 1960).
65. 156 Ohio St. 475, 104 N.E.2d 9 (1952).
66. Campbell v. Lloyd, 162 Ohio St. 203, 122 N.E.2d 695 (1954).
67. In re Glover's Estate, 371 P.2d 361 (Hawaii 1962).
1514 [Vol. 64:1499
HeinOnline  -- 64 Mich. L. Rev.  1514 1965-1966
Estate Tax Burden
not dispositive in favor of a dissenting widow, and, as we shall see,
the absence of such a doctrine does not require a decision that is un-
favorable to her. Nevertheless, one of the purposes of equitable ap-
portionment, albeit not the primary purpose, is to divide the tax
burden among the beneficiaries in some equitable manner, and the
net effect of deducting estate taxes before computing the widow's
share is inconsistent with that purpose. This inconsistency is not of
sufficient magnitude to warrant modifying statutory language defin-
ing the widow's share, but where there are other compelling reasons
for so doing, the doctrine may buttress the widow's claim.
B. Statutory Apportionment
In those states where the legislature has adopted a statute appor-
tioning estate taxes, the case for computing the widow's share with-
out regard to taxes is far more compelling. By adopting an apportion-
ment statute, the state legislature has demonstrated its desire to have
the estate tax burden allocated on an equitable basis, and (in vir-
tually all such statutes) to exonerate the surviving widow's property
to the extent that it qualifies for the marital deduction. As noted
previously, in most statutes this legislative objective appears to be
controlling, even to the extent that it may conflict with the normal
intent of the decedent. If the statute defining the dissenting widow's
share is susceptible to a construction that would require the compu-
tation to be made without regard to estate taxes, that construction
should be applied in order to accomplish the legislative policy dem-
onstrated by the apportionment statute.68 Indeed, in at least one case
where the statute defining the widow's share expressly provided that
estate taxes were to be deducted in making the computation, the
subsequent enactment of an apportionment statute was deemed
so inconsistent with the statutory scheme of computation that the
provision for deducting estate taxes was deemed repealed by impli-
cation.69
The only case in which a statutory rule of apportionment was
found to be applicable while a dissenting widow's share was
charged with estate taxes is Weinberg v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co.,70
a 1951 Maryland decision. At the time of that case, the Maryland
apportionment statute, which had been enacted prior to the adoption
68. Cf. In re Rosenfeld's Estate, 376 Pa. 42, 101 A.2d 684 (1954).
69. In re Fuch's Estate, 60 So. 2d 536 (Fla. 1952). See also In re Wolf's Estate, 307
N.Y. 280, 121 N.E.2d 224 (1954).
70. 85 A.2d 50 (Md. Ct. App. 1951).
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of the marital deduction provision in 1948, exonerated a widow's
share of the estate from taxes in certain circumstances, but it spe-
cifically provided that there should be no exoneration in situations
where the widow renounced her husband's will. The Weinberg deci-
sion was therefore grounded on the peculiar language of the Mary-
land apportionment statute, and in view of Maryland's recent adop-
tion of the Uniform Estate Tax Apportionment Act, 1 it is unlikely
that Weinberg will be followed by the Maryland courts in cases
arising under the mew statute.
III. ADDITIONAL REASONS FOR FAVORING A DISSENTING WIDOW
Apart from the applicability of apportionment rules, there are
independent reasons advanced on behalf of the dissenting widow's
position, and her share may be freed from an estate tax burden even
though no apportionment is available under state law.72 However,
the applicability of apportionment rules lends support to the widow's
claim.
A. The Destruction of the Widow's Share
One appealing argument advanced for the widow is that if her
forced share is burdened by estate taxes, it may be substantially di-
minished, or even entirely eliminated, through the inclusion in the
decedent's gross estate of non-probate assets.78 As previously noted,
in cases where non-probate assets are included in the decedent's
estate, the amount of estate tax liability may exceed the value of the
probate estate.74 The legislative purpose underlying the widow's
statutory right of election could be frustrated and in some circum-
stances entirely nullified if the widow's forced share were rendered
vulnerable to diminution from non-probate oriented estate taxes.
However, this argument is more persuasive in a jurisdiction which
has no apportionment rules than in one which requires contribution
from the recipients of the non-probate assets, since in the latter case
the widow's share is insulated from the tax liability arising from
71. Section 162, ch. 907 of the Maryland Laws of 1965 repealed the prior apportion-
ment statute (MD. AN. CODE art. 81, § 156 (1957)), and adopted the UNIFORM! ESTATE
TAx APPORTIONMENT Aar. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 162 (1965 Replacement).
72. See In re Barnhart's Estate, 102 N.H. 519, 162 A.2d 168 (1960); cf. Dodd v.
United States, 345 F.2d 715 (3d Cir. 1965); First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 223
F. Supp. 19 (D. Kan. 1964); In re Burnett, 50 N.J. Super. 482, 142 A.2d 695 (1958).
73. In re Wolf's Estate, 307 N.Y. 280, 121 N.E.2d 224, 228 (1954). See also Marans v.
Newland, 143 Mont. 388, 890 P.2d 448 (1964).
74. See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
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those assets in which she does not share.75 Indeed, this consideration
persuaded the Supreme Court of Montana to compute a dissenting
widow's share without regard to estate taxes arising from non-probate
assets, even though the statutory provision defining her share ex-
pressly provided for the deduction of all "estate taxes." 76
B. The Marital Deduction
The most compelling reasons for disregarding estate taxes in
computing the widow's forced share arise from the nature and back-
ground of the marital deduction allowance. Commencing with the
1980 decision of the Supreme Court in Poe v. Seaborn,77 married
couples in community property states enjoyed an income splitting
advantage which was not available to couples in common-law states.
In addition, under the laws of most community property states, a
husband and wife are each deemed to own one half of the commu-
nity, and therefore only one half of the community estate is taxed on
the husband's death.7 8 Thus, the income-splitting advantage avail-
able to couples in community property states extended to estate taxes
as well. In 1942, Congress sought to remedy this disparity of tax
treatment among the states by altering the estate and gift taxation
of community property, but the changes made in that year only sub-
stituted different inequalities for those previously existing.7 9 The
community property states made vigorous and continual objections
to the 1942 amendments.80 Moreover, the income tax disparity,
which was far more significant than the estate and gift tax treatment,
was not remedied by the 1942 Act. In order to provide their citizens
with the tax benefits derived from the community property laws, five
states and the then Territory of Hawaii adopted a community prop-
75. See Old Colony Trust Co. v. McGowan, 163 A.2d 538 (Me. 1960).
76. Marans v. Newland, 143 Mont. 388, 390 P.2d 443, 446 (1964).
77. 282 U.S. 101 (1930). Poe v. Seaborn held that income earned by a husband
residing in a community property state (Washington) was deemed earned one half by
the husband and one half by his wife.
18. Greenwood v. Commissioner, 134 F.2d 915, 918-19 (9th Cir. 1943).
79. See Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 402(b), 56 Stat. 798, 942. With the excep-
tion of property that could be traced to contribution or personal services of the sur-
viving spouse, all of the community property was included in the estate of the first
spouse to die. In no event was the amount included in the estate to be less than that
over which the decedent had a testamentary power. In most states, this provision
established a minimum inclusion of one half of the community and could require
inclusion of the entire community. Thus, community property was taxed in a manner
similar to jointly held property with the added disadvantage of the minimum inclu-
sion of one half of the property.
80. See LowNDss = Kax ER, FEDmAL EsTrATE AND GInT TAXEs 369 (2d ed. 1962).
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erty system, and other states, including New York, commenced con-
sideration of such a move.81
In order to halt the serious disruption of established property
law by tax-conscious states, and in order to minimize the differences
in federal tax treatment between citizens of community property
states and citizens of common-law states,8 2 Congress repealed the
81. See BTrR, FEDERAL INCOME ESTATE AND GIr TAXATroN 332-33 .n.2 (3d ed.
1964). The states adopting community property laws were Michigan, Nebraska, Okla-
homa, Oregon, and Pennsylvania. The Pennsylvania statute was held unconstitutional
in Wilcox v. Pennsylvania Mut. Life Ins. Co., 357 Pa. 581, 55 A.2d 521 (1947), and
the Oklahoma statute (which, like the Oregon statute, established an optional com-
munity property system) was held to be ineffective for income-splitting purposes in
Commissioner v. Harmon, 323 U.S. 44 (1944).
82. H.R. RaE. No. 1274 on the Revenue Act of 1948, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 23-25
(1948) (1948-1 CuM. BuLL. 241, 258-61), states: "Recently, however, a number of States
have shifted from the common law to the community property system. In these cases
benefits under the Federal income tax which residents of the State would obtain un-
der the community property system were largely responsible for the abandonment of
common law. After one false start, Oklahoma joined the community property group
in 1945. Oregon, Michigan, Nebraska, and Pennsylvania were added to the list in 1947.
However, the Pennsylvania law has since been found to be unconstitutional.
"The geographical differences in the impact of the individual income tax resulting
from the fact that 12 States use community property raises a serious problem, but the
fact which makes action at the present session imperative is the potential rapid ex-
tension of community property to a large number of other common-law States. The
adoption of community property has been advocated widely in spite of a growing
awareness of the substantial differences between community property and common
law which make a transition from one system to the other extremely difficult. It is
now recognized that this transition will be a period of extreme confusion during
which the courts, the administrative officials and the legislature will be working out
the detailed application of a new and strange system of property law. Nevertheless,
many responsible State officials have reached the conclusion that the difference be-
tween the impact of the Federal income tax as it applies in community property and
common law jurisdictions is so great that the use of community property cannot be
avoided....
"Many States are waiting to see what Congress will do about the problem of geo-
graphical equalization. If the necessary action is not taken, there will be a flood of
ill-advised State legislation intended to produce the same results, but doing so in a
manner which has most unfortunate consequences, not only for the taxpayers involved,
but also for all the persons who must use or administer the property laws of the
States which rush into the community-property system.
"Your committee believes that the best answer to the problem of geographical
equalization is the splitting of the combined income of the husband and wife....
"Adoption of these income splitting provisions will provide geographical equaliza-
tion in the impact of the tax on individual net incomes. The unfortunate and im-
petuous enactment of community property legislation by states that have long used
the common law will be forestalled ...
"The basic differences between community and common law interpretations of
property rights have also resulted in geographical inequalities in the application of
the estate and gift taxes ....
"Your committee does not believe that a satisfactory solution to the problem of
geographical equalization can be reached by the tactics applied in the 1942 amend-
ments. Hence the repeal of those amendments is recommended, effective with the
enactment of this bill. Your committee would be unwilling, however, to repeal the
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1942 community property provisions and enacted the split income
tax provision, the split gift provision, and the estate and gift tax
marital deduction provisions.83 The effect of the estate tax marital
deduction provision is that property which passes or has passed from
the decedent to his widow, and which meets certain requirements, is
deductible from the decedent's gross estate in an amount not to ex-
ceed one half of the decedent's adjusted gross estate.
In most circumstances, the property passing to the widow pur-
suant to her election to take her forced share will qualify for the
marital deduction and will therefore reduce the tax burden of the
estate. If the widow's share is computed after the deduction of taxes,
then she must bear a portion of the estate tax burden even though
the property received by her was excluded from the computation of
that tax and therefore did not cause any part of its imposition. Of
course, if for some reason a portion of the widow's share should fail
to qualify for the marital deduction, such portion is not tax exempt
and should therefore contribute to the satisfaction of the tax burden,
but only to the extent that it is not deductible. The Court of Ap-
peals for the Fourth Circuit once declared that to charge a dissenting
widow's share of the estate with the federal tax would be "unfair
and unjust,"8 4 and accordingly noted its approval of a South Caro-
lina probate court decision computing a widow's intestate share with-
out an allowance for estate taxes. The Fourth Circuit also placed
considerable reliance on the fact that a contrary result would frus-
trate the congressional purpose underlying the enactment of the mar-
ital deduction provision, which was to obtain a geographical equal-
ization of tax treatment by freeing the interest of the surviving
spouse in a common-law state from estate taxes so that her treatment
would be comparable to the tax treatment afforded citizens of com-
munity property states. This consideration has been influential in
the decisions of a number of courts.85
amendments without corrective legislation. Repeal alone would reproduce the pre-1942
conditions which are even further from equalization than existing law.
"With the repeal of the 1942 amendments your committee recommends an appli-
cation of the 'splitting' technique used under the income tax. . . . In the case of
the estate tax, 'splitting' means an exemption in common law states of up to one
half of the decedent's estate if it passes outright to the surviving spouse." See also
S. R m. No. 1013 on the Revenue Act of 1948, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 23-29 (1948) (1948-1
CuM. BULL. 285, 302-06); 94 CONG. RFe. 3040-41 (1948).
83. Revenue Act of 1948, ch. 168, §§ 301, 351, 361, 362, 364, 62 Stat. 110, 114, 116-21,
125-28.
84. Pitts v. Hamrick, 228 F.2d 486, 490 (4th Cir. 1955). See also Hammond v.
Wheeler, 847 S.W.2d 884, 893 (Mo. 1961).
85. See First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 233 F. Supp. 19 (D. Kan. 1964); Lincoln
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A significant number of courts, however, have held that the de-
termination of a widow's forced share is controlled by state law, and
that the congressional purpose in enacting the marital deduction pro-
visions is irrelevant.8 6 These courts point to section 2056(b)(4) of the
1954 Code 7 as indicating that Congress contemplated that a widow's
share might be required to bear a portion of the estate tax burden
under local law and consequently did not intend to pre-empt the
issue. While these decisions are correct in asserting that state rather
than federal law controls, they fail to consider the interplay between
the congressional act and the policies of the state legislatures. Con-
gress did not adopt the marital deduction provisions for its own
selfish reasons or even to further a pervasive national policy favoring
widows. In fact, Congress merely reacted to the vigorous complaints
of the states regarding the inequality existing before the adoption
of the marital deduction provision, and to the readiness of the legis-
latures in the common-law states to disrupt established property sys-
tems in order to obtain desired tax advantages for their citizens. It
is difficult to believe that state legislatures would be willing to enact
(or seriously consider enacting) an entirely foreign property system
(which in most states would substantially enhance the size of a
widow's forced share of her husband's estate) solely to obtain tax
advantages for its citizens, but after having been granted tax advan-
tages similar to those available in community property states would
stubbornly insist upon minimizing the proffered relief. Rather than
vigorously asserting the states' independence from the congressional
purpose, the courts should consider whether the legislative policy of
the state involved encompasses the benefits granted by the marital
deduction provision.8 It is this writer's opinion that the presump-
tion should be made in favor of maximizing the widow's share, un-
less the legislature has indicated a contrary intent (such as was done
by Alabama and North Carolina), rather than to presume that the
widow's share (and the estate) should not benefit from the marital
Bank & Trust Co. v. Huber, 240 S.W.2d 89 (Ky. Ct. App. 1951); In re Burnett, 50 N.J.
Super. 482, 142 A.2d 695 (1958); In re Rosenfeld's Estate, 376 Pa. 42, 101 A.2d 684
(1954).
86. E.g., Herson v. Mills, 221 F. Supp. 714 (D.D.C. 1968); In re Glover's Estate, 871
P.2d 861 (Hawaii 1962); Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Green, 286 N.C. 654, 73 S.E,2d
879 (1953); In re Uihlein's Will, 264 Wis. 862, 59 N.W.2d 641 (1953). See also Moor-
man v. Moorman, 340 Mich. 636, 66 N.W.2d 248 (1954).
87. INT. REV. CODE oF 1954, § 2056(b)(4) provides, inter alia, that the computation
of the value of property passing to the surviving spouse must allow for the effect that
the federal estate tax and certain other taxes have on such property.
88. See Dodd v. United States, 345 F.2d 715 (3d Cir. 1965); Gesner v. Roberts, 88
N.J. Super. 278, 212 A.2d 43 (Ch. 1965).
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deduction unless the legislature has affirmatively indicated that it
desires that result. The suggested presumption in favor of permitting
the widow the full benefit of the marital deduction is particularly
strong where the dissenting widow's share is computed according to
the share she would have received had her husband died intestate.
In the latter regard, the decision of the Michigan Supreme Court
in Moorman v. Moormans9 is noteworthy. In that case, the court re-
jected the widow's claim that her one-third share of the "residue"
of her intestate husband's estate should be determined without re-
gard to estate taxes, and held that the congressional purpose in en-
acting the marital deduction was irrelevant. The decision is some-
what perplexing, since Michigan was one of the states that adopted
community property laws for a brief period in order to secure the
tax advantages ultimately given to common-law states by the 1948
act. The Michigan legislature subsequently adopted an apportion-
ment statute.90
IV. CONCLUSION
In states which have adopted a statutory method of tax apportion-
ment, the dissenting widow's claim for tax exemption in computing
her share is reasonably secure. In states which have not enacted such
a statute, widows have had some success in obtaining tax exemptions,
but, from an overall viewpoint, it appears that they have not received
the treatment they deserve. In fairness, the widow should not be
required to bear an estate tax burden that was imposed on account of
the transfer of property to persons other than the widow herself, and
it is unlikely that the state legislature would desire that she do so.
The purpose of granting the widow a statutory election is to protect
her from disinheritance or inadequate testamentary gifts from her
husband, and the legislative policy underlying such provisions would
certainly be furthered by permitting the widow to enjoy fully the
tax relief granted by the federal government. Moreover, prior to the
adoption of the marital deduction provisions, many of the common-
law states evidenced a concern over the tax detriments that their citi-
zens suffered in contrast to the citizens of community property states,
and the legislatures of some of these common-law state'felt driven
to the extreme solution of adopting community property laws in
order to overcome those detriments. Surely such states would not
89. 340 Mich. 636, 66 N.W.2d 248 (1954).
90. See note 27 supra.
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wish to deprive their citizens of the benefits granted by the federal
government in response to the concern initially evidenced by the
states themselves.
In any event, the courts should not seek to resolve the question
of the estate tax burden on the widow's share solely by reference to
the technical definition of the words employed in the state statute
defining that share, particularly where the statute was enacted prior
to the adoption of the marital deduction provision in 1948. The
courts should consider the impact of the marital deduction on the
widow's share, and they should attempt to determine how the marital
deduction allowance coordinates with state legislative policy and
what interpretation of the provision defining the widow's statutory
share best conforms with that policy. The resolution of the question
involved is more complex than a mechanical application of diction-
ary definitions or sterile rules of construction.
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